Differences between the political behavior of men and women have been a topic of political research for a long time. One focus of the "gender gap" discussion has been on gender differences in electoral behavior. Even though the act of voting itself is fairly equally distributed, women and men seem to show different preferences when it comes to filling out the ballots. While women voted for conservative and center-right parties to a greater degree than men until the 1970s, these gender differences are no longer prevalent in many advanced industrialized democracies. Instead, women, in comparison to men, are nowadays leaning more to the left in their voting decisions. Although analyses have revealed that the "modern" gender voting gap varies across countries, most studies have only focused on individual-level explanations. Using data from the European Values Study for 2008, this article provides a comparative analysis regarding the current state of the gender voting gap for twenty-five European Union member states. It is the first attempt to explore in how far cross-national differences in the modern gender voting gap can be explained, not only by the individual, but also by the socio-structural and cultural-attitudinal context. The findings for 2008 indicate that, in comparison with previous studies, the modern gender voting gap can be confirmed for most of the countries. Its size, however, varies across countries. Moreover, this article shows that, besides individual characteristics, both socio-structural and cultural-attitudinal country factors contribute to the understanding of cross-national differences in the modern gender voting gap.
Introduction
Differences between the political behavior of men and women have been a topic of political culture and public opinion research since their very beginnings (e.g., Duverger 1955; Lipset 1981) . A so-called gender gap in political behavior in Western democracies has been discussed at least three-fold. The first concerns women's underrepresentation in many forms of political participation, particularly at the level of political elites. The second provides empirical evidence, which suggests that women have a different understanding of politics and, therefore, value different issues than men (e.g., Jelen, Thomas, and Wilcox 1994; Norris 1988 Norris , 2007 . The last gender gap, which is the focus of this article, deals with electoral behavior. Though the act of voting itself is fairly equally distributed (e.g., Burns, Schlozman, and Verba 2001; Norris 2007) , women and men seem to show different preferences when filling out the ballot. While women voted for conservative and center-right parties to a greater degree than men until the 1970s, these gender differences vanished in many advanced industrialized democracies during the 1980s. In its place, a new pattern emerged showing that women, in comparison to men, were now leaning more to the left in their voting decisions (e.g., Studlar, McAllister, and Hayes 1998) .
Cross-national analyses have empirically examined these developments for many advanced democracies (Giger 2009; Inglehart and Norris 2000, 2003) . They revealed that, until the beginning of this century, the size of this "modern" gender voting gap varies across countries and that some of the countries, such as Spain, Italy, and Luxembourg, are not following this trend. Even though many studies have a cross-national approach, most of them focus only on individual-level explanations of the gender voting gap. The potential impact of macro-level factors is often discussed only implicitly (e.g., Giger 2009; Inglehart and Norris 2000) and rarely empirically analyzed. This neglects, however, the fact that country-specific institutions also impact individual political preferences and voting behavior. The analysis of macro-level factors may thus enhance the understanding of the observed cross-national gender differences in voting behavior.
Using data from the European Values Study (EVS) for the year 2008, this article provides, on the one hand, a comparative analysis regarding the current state of the gender voting gap for twenty-five European Union (EU) member states. On the other hand, it explores in how far the observed gender differences in voting behavior can be explained, not only by the individual, but also by the institutional, cultural, and political context. It is the first attempt to empirically test whether and which macro indicators account for cross-national differences in the modern gender voting gap. Therefore, the study overcomes previous limitations which were confined to individual-level explanations.
The next section provides a brief reflection on the history of the gender voting gap, as well as a short review of the literature on explanations of the different voting behavior of women and men and the cross-national differences therein. Next, the short-comings of previous research are taken as a starting point to provide a broader theoretical framework and formulate the underlying hypotheses of the present study. In the third section, the data, operationalization, and applied methods are described. In the fourth section, the bivariate and multivariate results are presented. Finally, the results are summarized and discussed in the concluding fifth section, which will in turn provide insights into underlying reasons for gender-specific differences in voting behavior across EU countries.
Gender and Electoral Behavior History of the Gender Voting Gap and Country Differences
Contrary to class, religion, or region, gender has never been a clear-cut cleavage determining electoral choice (e.g., Lipset 1981) . Both men and women are experiencing cross-cutting cleavages. Therefore, their different voting behavior has not been as pronounced as, for instance, between workers and members of the upper-middle class. Nevertheless, from the beginning of political culture research, gender has always been a category of interest in studies of political behavior (e.g., Almond and Verba 1963; Duverger 1955) . With the assumed weakening of the binding power of classical political conflicts, some researchers even underline that other cleavages, such as gender, might become more relevant in the future (e.g., Knutsen 2001, 312) .
As already indicated, the "history" of the gender voting gap in Western democracies can roughly be divided into three phases (Inglehart and Norris 2000, 2003) . The first phase (the traditional gender gap) lasted until the late 1970s/1980s and is typically characterized by a more conservative vote from women in comparison to men (e.g., Campbell et al. 1960; Norris 1988; Randall 1987) . This was predominantly explained with women's more pronounced religiosity (see Manow and Emmenegger 2012 for a detailed discussion) and their lower labor market participation (i.e., Baxter and Lansing 1983; Blankenburg 1967) . The clear-cut party competition, with regard to religion, traditional family structures, and a woman's devotion to her family, worked in favor of a more conservative female vote (e.g., Norris 1988; Studlar et al. 1998) . At the end of the 1970s, the gender differences in the ballot started to vanish, or at least substantially diminish, in several countries, especially in Canada, the United States, and the Netherlands. This phase of so-called female party dealignment has partly been explained by modernization and secularization processes, as well as by the accompanying decomposition of cleavages in general (Inglehart and Norris 2000) . Shortly thereafter, in the 1980s, surprisingly new gender-driven voting differences emerged in some advanced democracies, such as the United States, West Germany, and the Netherlands (Inglehart and Norris 2000) . This time, however, the gender gap was reversed and exhibited a female preference for parties on the left. Ever since, a third phase defined by a The Gender Gap in Voting Revisited modern gender voting gap has entered the electoral scene. However, these new emerging electoral gender differences are rather seen as a reflection of overall societal value changes leading to the de-alignment phase (e.g., Inglehart and Norris 2000) .
With respect to cross-national differences, the study by Inglehart and Norris (2000, 449) for the 1990s, found that for half of the examined postindustrial countries (except Spain and Finland) the modern gender gap existed until the mid-1990s, whereas the traditional gender voting gap continued to be observed in the majority of developing and post-communist countries. Giger's more recent study (2009) confirmed that the modern gender gap can be observed in the majority of Western European countries. However, women still tend to vote more to the right than men in Italy, Spain, and Luxembourg (although in Luxembourg and Italy this traditional gender voting gap has substantially decreased).
1
Since 2000, there has been no cross-national evidence regarding the situation of the modern gender voting gap, or support for Inglehart's and Norris' realignment theory. Therefore, one aim of this article is to fill this gap by providing a description of the current situation of gender differences in voting across Europe. In this context, not only Western European countries, but also post-communist countries will be considered.
2 As nearly 25 years have passed since the end of the Cold War, and many former communist countries have been integrated into Western political institutions, it seems important to take these countries into account.
Why Should the Female Vote be Different?
Individual-level determinants. At the individual level, the literature discusses two predominant explanations for the emergence of the modern gender voting gap: (i) socio-structural and/or situational 3 and (ii) cultural and/or attitudinal factors.
Socio-structural and situational explanations consider a woman's role and position in society and family life. It is argued that due to females' higher labor force participation and economic independence, as well as their greater exposure to labor market inequalities (such as low-paid pink-collar jobs and low status positions), progressive(-left) voting of women should increase in comparison to men (e.g., De Vaus and McAllister 1989; Iversen and Rosenbluth 2006; Togeby 1994) . In addition, the continuous change of traditional gender stereotypes and family structures leads to greater instability, especially for the female life course (high divorce or single mother risk). Due to these changes, women might be in favor of the de-familialization of social services, the extension of public welfare institutions and equal opportunity policies which are addressed mostly by left-of-center political parties (e.g., Erickson and O'Neill 2002; Iversen and Rosenbluth 2006; Manza and Brooks 1998) .
Besides the predominant socio-structural and situational explanations, cultural and attitudinal explanations focusing on the political attitudes and value orientations of women might also partly explain the modern gender voting gap. It is argued that the above-described societal transformation processes also contribute to the formation of political attitudes in favor of social policies traditionally delivered by leftist parties. Moreover, a weakening effect of religion on political attitudes, which is not per se gender-specific, can be observed. As the religious ties of women have been closer than those of men, it affects the female vote more than the male one (e.g., Giger 2009; Manow and Emmenegger 2012; Studlar et al. 1998) . A further crucial aspect of the described societal changes is the spread of post-materialist and feminist ideas affecting the traditional gender role socialization throughout the last decades. This, in addition, contributed to the diminishing of gender differences in the de-alignment phase. Finally, when so-called soft and green political issues, which are in particular supported by women, became salient in Western politics in the 1970s (see Jelen et al. 1994) , these new values also spurred women's support for left-wing and green parties (e.g., Giger 2009, Inglehart and Norris 2000) .
The empirical findings concerning the explanatory power of the abovedescribed factors are divergent. Whereas Inglehart and Norris (2000) show that both structural and cultural aspects can account for some, if not most, of the variance of the modern gender voting gap, Iversen and Rosenbluth (2006) find that gender differences already vanish when structural characteristics are integrated into the model. These inconsistencies might stem from the selection and grouping of countries in the respective studies. This is in line with findings from cross-national analyses (e.g., Bergh 2007; Studlar et al. 1998) indicating that explanatory factors differ depending on the national context. Knutsen (2001) , for instance, has shown that even structurally and culturally similar Scandinavian countries (Norway, Sweden, and Denmark) differ to some extent with regard to the modern gender voting gap. These findings already point towards the relevance of the national context, and give rise to the question what contextual factors account for these differences.
Macro-level determinants. As already mentioned, explanations of the "new gender gap" and the observed cross-national differences have always, at least partially, referred to the institutional context. However, contrary to individuallevel reasoning, they have rarely been considered as additional explanatory factors, nor have they been tested in comprehensive analyses. In the framework of this article, we argue that the observed cross-national gender differences in voting cannot only be explained by the individual voter's socio-economic situation and political values. In contrast, the socio-economic, cultural, and political climate that is predominant in the country must be factored into the equation. Following the structure applied to the individual-level analysis, we also distinguish between socio-structural/situational and cultural-attitudinal context factors.
Socio-structural and situational context factors. Based on the aforementioned argument that women can be found disproportionately more often in precarious employment and/or socio-economic circumstances, it can be argued that they are likely to support left-wing parties and their welfare policies more strongly in countries with a higher female employment rate. The positive correlation between a higher female labor force and female left voting has been confirmed for Europe and the United States (i.e., Box-Steffensmeier, DeBoef, and Lin 2004 for the U.S.-American case; Giger 2009; Iversen and Rosenbluth 2006) . Accordingly, we hypothesize that women in countries with a higher female employment rate are, on average, leaning more to the left (H1). Based on previous findings, however, we expect female participation in the labor market, at the macro-level, to be more than a simple composition effect: A high rate of women's labor market participation can also be seen as an indicator for a decline in traditional family structures (Giger 2009 ). This could further strengthen a woman's decision to vote for left parties. In this context, it might also be argued that, besides the general labor market participation of women, the extent to which she engages in the labor market is relevant. Part-time employment, for instance, is a means of enabling women, to a certain extent, to combine family and career responsibilities. In this line of reasoning, two hypotheses can be formulated. On the one hand, it could be expected that women are more likely to vote for left parties in countries with a large share of female part-timers (H2a). In this context, the reason for voting left could be either motivated through the persistence of a rather conservative institutional setting and the lack of support for women to combine work and family obligations. Or it could also be seen as a reward for the family-friendly policies of left-parties. On the other hand, a large share of female part-time employment may reflect women's general preferences for traditional gender work arrangements. Viewed from this perspective, they may rather lean towards the right in countries with a large share of female part-timers (H2b). Besides a country's female employment rate, Box-Steffensmeier, DeBoef, and Lin (2004, 520) argue that women are particularly more susceptible to general economic climate factors than men, probably because they are in general more economically vulnerable than men and their personal situation suffers especially from a negative economic climate. However, as it may be assumed that women rather look at their gender-specific benchmark, we expect that, in countries with a higher female unemployment rate, the likelihood of women voting for left parties increases on average (H3). As female labor market engagement and their future career chances are strongly connected to their educational achievements, it might be argued that high educational achievements (like a university diploma) also contribute to their economic and political autonomy (Box-Steffensmeier et al. 2004) . Therefore, we hypothesize that women vote more to the left than men in countries with a high rate of female tertiary graduates (as a measure of a high educational standard) (H4).
In addition to economic factors, it might be argued that the achievements of women and their involvement in the labor market are also determined by the welfare state and its support of family-relevant issues. For instance, as left parties relate more towards such policies than right parties, it can be hypothesized that the likelihood of the female left vote is on average higher in countries with low women-and family-directed public expenditure than in countries with extended social policies (H5). This, however, does not necessarily mean that women in countries with an above-average public expenditure on women and family vote more to the right. They could also support socialist and social democratic parties in order to guarantee further expenses.
Cultural-attitudinal context factors. In the context of cultural explanations, cross-national studies have so far mainly focused on measurements related to post-materialism, gender equality, and religion. Particularly in the context of Inglehart's and Norris' developmental theory, it has been argued that higher levels of post-materialism, feminism, and legally institutionalized gender equality indicate cultural and societal modernization with regard to women's role in society (see also the impact of feminism, i.e., Conover 1988; Cook and Wilcox 1991) . Therefore, a woman's tendency to vote left should be strengthened in such countries. Findings in this respect are diverse. Giger (2009) , for instance, found a more profound modern gender voting gap in postmaterialistic countries. However, she did not find any effects related to the national level of feminism. As Giger's study is based on a slightly different dependent variable, we want to test the assumption underlying the developmental theory with a more recent and more comprehensive sample. We hypothesize that women, on average, should lean more to the left in countries with higher levels of post-materialism (H6), a higher legalization of gender equality (H7), and a higher general gender equality climate (H8). In addition, several authors (e.g., Iversen and Rosenbluth 2006) discuss the impact of divorce at the contextual level. A divorce represents a potential economic life risk, particularly for women. However, it also leads to independence from a husband or partner. Against this background, it can be argued that women are more likely to take a left political stance in countries with high divorce rates. Edlund and Pande (2002, 920) found a positive correlation between divorce rates and the female left vote in the United States. Consequently, it is hypothesized that, in countries with higher divorce rates, women are, on average, leaning more to the left (H9).
With respect to the impact of a country's predominant religion, it has been argued that the modern gender voting gap should be less pronounced in countries where the majority of the population is catholic in comparison to countries where the relation between the religious denominations is more equally distributed. It may even be inexistent (Giger 2009 ). This seems reasonable as Catholicism makes strong arguments in favor of traditional gender roles and a conservative positioning of women in society. On average, women have always been more religiously involved than men. However, this effect could not be confirmed by Giger (2009) . As a consequence, two alternative hypotheses are tested: either the assumption can be supported that, in countries where Catholicism is the predominant religion, women are less likely to lean to the left (H10a), or the assumption fails and Catholicism proves to have no effect on female left voting behavior (H10b).
Data, Operationalization and Analytical Strategy Data
The fourth wave of the EVS (2008) is used to address these formulated hypotheses. The EVS provides insight into the ideas, beliefs, preferences, attitudes, values, and opinions of citizens in forty-seven European countries. It is based on representative multi-stage or stratified random samples of the adult population (those who are 18 years old and older) who have been interviewed using a standardized questionnaire between 2008 and 2010. All refusals and missing values were omitted from the analysis. The analysis is limited to twenty-five countries (Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the UK) providing detailed information on all relevant micro-level variables as well as macro-level indicators. The final N is 17,601 respondents and varies at the national level between 425 respondents in Ireland to 1,133 respondents in Denmark. To address the issue of context, a set of indicators reflecting the socio-structural, cultural, and political dimensions of the different countries are derived from various international and European sources (e.g., EU, UN, and OECD).
Operationalization of Variables
Micro-level variables. The dependent variable is examined at the individual level and refers to the questions where respondents are asked about their willingness to vote if there was an election the next day (if there was a general election tomorrow, can you tell me if you would vote?) and the possible party they would vote for (If yes: which political party would you vote for?). The EVS provides an additional variable of an expert judgment on a 10-point left-right scale for the respective country's main parties ranging from 1 (left) to 10 (right). 4 As we are interested in whether the left/right vote varies between women and men, the main independent individual-level variable is woman measured as a binary variable (female ¼ 1 and male ¼ 0).
Macro-level variables. Based on the theoretical framework developed in the previous sections, it is argued that the observed cross-national differences regarding the modern gender voting gap can be partly explained through a country's context. Therefore, macro-level variables related to the sociostructural and cultural-attitudinal dimensions are included in the analysis (see table 1 ). To capture the socio-structural dimension at the country level, five indicators are included: the female employment rate, the female part-time rate, 
EVS 2008
Cultural/attitudinal controls Post-materialist index Categorical variable distinguishing between post-materialistic, materialistic and mixed types (ref.) . The distinction relies on the reduced Inglehart ranking used in the questionnaire (v201 and v202). The four value types are created as follows: post-materialists stress "protection of freedom of speech" and "giving people more say in government decisions'," whereas materialists emphasize the importance of "maintaining order in the nation" and "fighting rising prices'." The mixed type shows either a preference for a post-materialist item over a materialist one, or vice versa.
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The Gender Gap in Voting Revisited With respect to the cultural dimension at the country level, five measurements are included. To capture a country's post-materialistic climate, the percentage of people within a country indicating a post-materialistic attitude (based on the categorical individual-level variable see below) is used; the gender equality climate is measured with the Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM) which indirectly represents the societal level of equality by measuring the "empowerment" of women in the public sphere across countries as well as with the recognition of abortion rights [measured as a dummy variable, allows without restriction as to reason (¼1) and only restricted abortion right (¼0)]. We also include the percentage of divorces within a country which reflects, on the one hand, an increasing economic risk for women but, on the other hand, increasing independency of women from a husband or partner. Finally, a country's religious climate is measured as the percentage of Catholics (based on the individual-level variable) within a country, indicating whether Catholicism is the dominant religion in the country.
Control variables. Finally, several micro-and macro-level control variables associated with gender differences in voting behavior are included (see table 1 ). As already indicated, most of the previous studies on the gender voting gap focused on individual-level explanations, showing that, in the case of both women and men, a lower socio-economic status, being higher educated and being young is related to left voting. Therefore, we include age, education, and socio-economic status as individual-level controls in the analysis. Moreover, several individual socio-structural factors, such as being married (having ever been married ¼ 1 and single ¼ 0); having a child (yes ¼ 1, no ¼ 0); and the employment status (differentiating between working, other forms of work and unemployment) are included as controls. 5 In addition, we also control for four individual cultural factors, post-materialism (based on the Inglehart index which measures respondents' prioritization of freedom of speech and democratic input on government decisions as the main objectives, we distinguish between post-materialists, materialists, and mixed type), religious heritage (referring to religious denomination: Atheist, Catholic, Protestant, and other religion), church attendance (how often the participant attends religious service), and gender conservatism represented by a dummy variable referring to the question whether interviewees agree or disagree that what women really want is a home and children.
In order to control for contextual factors, former communist countries (measured as dummy variable) and the national electoral system (indicating The Gender Gap in Voting Revisited whether a party system has a proportional, mixed, or a majority system) are included. Moreover, in order to capture the general national economic climate, we also include the GDP of a country.
The variables for the complete sample are summarized in table 2. The overall mean for the left/right placement of the intended party vote is 5.4 (for women 5.3 and for men 5.6). An additional analysis indicates that approximately 40.7 percent of the EVS samples provide answers equal to or lower than four on the ten-point scale, with only approximately 2.2 percent indicating an extreme left-wing party vote and only around 3.8 percent of the EVS sample intending to vote for parties which can be placed on the extreme right-wing side.
Analytical Strategy
To examine cross-national variation in female voting behavior, a multi-level analysis is performed. A multi-level design explains a phenomenon at the individual level (e.g., female voting behavior) through effects at different levels. As noted above, the gender differences in voting left may be due to individual characteristics. However, different country-specific institutional contexts may also affect electoral behavior. From a theoretical and statistical perspective, a multi-level analysis is appropriate in this study because it combines different levels of analysis (the micro-and macro-levels) into a single framework that takes into account nested sources of variability. In the case of complex variability, there is variability not only between individuals, but also between countries. It would thus be incorrect to use regular ordinary least squares regression techniques because the error terms at the macro-level are neglected and the standard errors of the parameters are underestimated (Bryk and Raudenbush 1992; Snijders and Bosker 1999) . Finally, the two-level contextual analysis also makes it possible to explicitly estimate the influence of the different levels on the dependent variable, i.e., to evaluate the share of the variance in the dependent variable explained at the different levels (for more details, see Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2005) .
The effects are investigated in several steps. An empty model (M0) is calculated, intending to measure the percentage of the variance explained at the individual and context levels. M1 is a random intercept model in which left voting may vary "on average" across countries, but the effect of the predictor variable (woman) is equal across countries. However, as one aim of the study is to assess the country variation with regard to the individual-level effect of being a woman (woman) on left/right electoral behavior, the model specificity must be enhanced by random slope models. In this respect, it is first assumed that the gender slope is random (M2), controlling for all relevant individualand macro-level variables. Furthermore, to determine whether the observed country-level variation in the gender slope is contingent upon the selected country-level factors, relevant cross-level interactions are included separately The Gender Gap in Voting Revisited in the models. These models (M3 -M14) shed light on the influence of pertinent institutional characteristics on gender-specific differences in voting. For all models, the residuals are assumed to be drawn from normal distributed populations, in order to be mutually independent and in order to have zero means, given the values of the explanatory variables. To ease the interpretation of the multi-level results, all selected macro-level variables have been centered on their respective grand means (Kreft, de Leeuw, and Aiken 1995) , except for three (right to abortion, post-communist country, and party system). Because a high correlation between macro-level variables is a potential problem in contextual analysis, a bivariate correlation analysis has also been performed at the country level. Since most of the correlations do not exceed a value of 0.6, 6 there is no reason to doubt the results on the grounds of multicollinearity between the macro variables. Finally, the analysis is conducted using the statistical program STATA version 12 (StataCorp 2011) which offers various advanced multi-level applications.
Results: Female Voting Behavior in European Countries-Revisited Bivariate Findings
Before discussing the results of the multivariate findings, figure 1 shows the variation in the difference between women and men on left/right party voting across Europe. Figure 1 indicates that, out of twenty-five countries, eighteen countries actually show the expected pattern that women, in comparison to men, tend to vote more to the left than to the right. This pattern is, however, reversed in most of the former communist countries, like Slovakia, the Czech Republic, Poland, Slovenia, and Hungary. Bulgaria and Estonia are the only former communist countries displaying the modern gender voting gap. To a certain extent, this confirms Inglehart's and Norris' analysis for the 1990s showing that the majority of the examined post-communist countries either display a traditional gender voting gap or no substantial difference between the male and female vote. These findings were seen as supporting the developmental theory, assuming that the female shift to the left party spectrum is influenced by modernization processes which still had to take place in former communist countries. Our evidence, almost 20 years later, however, raises the question whether there is more than a lack of societal modernization processes behind the persistence of the "old" gender voting gap in these countries. On the one hand, it could be argued that cultural changes need more time to take place; on the other hand, there could also be political reasons for this pattern. As Tavits and Letki (2009, 566) show, leftist parties in post-communist countries could behave differently than those in traditional democracies; they were "more likely to pursue rightist policies of fiscal responsibility and economic reform than the rightist parties themselves." This specific political context might be responsible for women's greater reluctance to vote for left parties. 7 Ireland seems to be the only Western EU country also displaying a traditional gender voting gap. This finding is particularly interesting as both Inglehart's and Norris' study for the 1990s and Giger's analysis for 2000, indicate that Irish women, on average, showed a much clearer left vote than Irish men. So, either a religious and/or cultural backlash has taken place in Ireland during the last decade or the political preferences of women have changed because of other reasons. 
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In contrast to findings of the studies for the 1990s and 2000, Luxembourg, Spain, Italy, and Finland now exhibit a rather clear modern gender voting gap. Whereas the late arrival of the modern gender voting gap can be explained with long enduring Catholic predominance for the former three countries, the case of Finland-the first state granting women the right to vote and a state with high levels of gender equality-remains a puzzle. Finally, Portugal seems to be the only country showing no significant gender differences in voting since the 1990s. With respect to observed gender differences, the gap is biggest in Norway, Switzerland, Sweden, Cyprus, and Denmark, indicating that in these countries, women tend to vote more leftist than men. With the exception of Cyprus (for which there are no comparable analyses available), these countries have shown a continuous increase of female left voting since the 1990s (Giger 2009; Inglehart and Norris 2000, 2003) .
Multivariate Findings
In keeping with the descriptive analyses, table 3 presents the results of the multivariate analyses of the relationship between the individual-level variables and the left/right party voting. The random coefficient of model 0 (the empty model) indicates that there is a significant within-and between-country variation in left/right voting when no individual-level variable is included in the model. Model M1 shows the results obtained from a random intercept model in which the individual-level variable "women" has been introduced. The result is in line with the expectations. The negative and significant effect indicates that women, in comparison to men, are on average more likely to prefer left-wing parties. As the main focus of this article is to analyze the extent to which macrolevel factors contribute to the explanation of the cross-national variation in the gender slope, model M2 includes a random slope allowing the observed gender effect to vary across countries (while all other variables are fixed). The random effect indicates that the average gender slope coefficient 2 0.11) varies significantly between countries. This gender effect is significant even though we control for all relevant individual-and macro-level variables. Moreover, as expected, results for the individual characteristics mostly confirm previous findings. The intra-class correlation coefficient rho (r) for this model equals 0. 09, 8 indicating that approximately 9 percent of the variance in the intended left/right party voting can be attributed to differences between countries.
In the next models, the defined contextual-level factors together with the respective cross-level interactions are included to determine their association with cross-national gender differences in political left/right voting. The intercept and slope of the variable "gender" are modeled as a function of the established macrolevel characteristics: the socio-structural (M3-M8), and cultural-political indicators (M9-M14).
Starting with the group of socio-structural factors, the results for the main effects show that none of the indicators is significant, pointing to the fact that they have no impact on voting behavior in general. However, as to the question 
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The Gender Gap in Voting Revisited in how far these indicators are also able to explain part of the observed crossnational variation in the gender slope, table 4 shows that three cross-level interactions are significant, confirming some of our hypotheses. In countries with an above-average female labor market participation rate (H1) or an above-average female part-time rate (H2a), the average negative gender effect is strengthened. Notes. To test the robustness of the coefficients an outlier analysis was performed using the DFBETA as an intuitive outlier statistic (applied to countries instead of individuals). DFBETA then indicates how strongly a regression coefficient is determined by a particular country by comparing a model with all countries to a model without that particular country. However, as the direction and the significance of the effects did not change they are not reported here. p , 0.05, *p , 0.01, **p , 0.001, ***; standard errors are in parenthesis, N (individual level) ¼ 17,601, N (country level) ¼ 25. 
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Hence, women tend to place themselves on the left of the political spectrum in those countries. With respect to the effect of female unemployment, the result reveals a statistically significant but positive sign. This indicates that in countries with an above-average female unemployment rate, women are less likely to place themselves amongst the left on the political spectrum. This result, in turn, means that we must reject H3. For the rest of the indicators, no significant effects can be found. 9 Even though we are not able to either confirm or reject our formulated hypotheses (H4 and H5) on this basis, the negative signs, at least, indicate that a large share of female tertiary graduates or an above-average public expenditure on families strengthen women's left voting. Finally, when testing a model including all socio-structural factors (M8), the findings show that none of the macro-and cross-level interaction effects remain significant, indicating that none of the selected socio-structural context factors dominates women's vote choice.
In the framework of this article it has also been argued that cultural factors might be important factors in explaining the observed cross-national gender differences in the political left/right voting (M9 -M14). It has been argued that higher levels of post-materialism, the right to abortion and higher gender empowerment indicate cultural and societal modernization with regard to the role of women in society. Therefore, a woman's tendency to vote left should be stronger in such countries. Starting with the main effects, the findings indicate that only the religious climate measurement has a negative and significant effect (M13). This implies that, in countries where Catholicism is the dominant religion, people on average tend to lean more towards left parties. For the rest of the indicators, no significant effects could be observed. Hence, they have no impact on voting behavior in general.
However, also here the central question remains in which way these indicators impact the cross-national differences of women's political preferences. In this context, two indicators seem to be relevant. The negative and significant cross-level interaction effect of GEM (M11) indicates that, in countries with an above-average gender empowerment, women are leaning, on average, more towards left-wing parties. Therefore, hypothesis H8 can be confirmed. The opposite, positive, and significant effect can be observed for the religious climate (M13). This at least confirms H10a, that in countries with a stronger catholic climate, women, on average, place themselves more towards the right-wing of the political spectrum. For the rest of the cross-level interactions no significant effects can be observed, indicating that a post-materialistic climate, the existence of abortion rights or a country's divorce rate have no impact on women's voting behavior. Also here we calculated a final model integrating all cultural factors (M14). The findings reveal that the contextual effect of Catholicism and the cross-level interaction effects for GEM and Catholicism remain significant.
Finally, it is to be determined to which extent the examined (micro-and) macro-level variables are capable of explaining cross-national gender differences in left-/right-wing voting. The intra-class correlation coefficient (rho) for M2 shows that approximately 9 percent of the variation in voting can be attributed to between-country variations. It may also be interesting to examine which factors explain most of this variation. A look at the significant reduction in the akaike information criterion across the various models M3 to M14 shows that, in particular, the effects of the female employment rate (M4) and the religious climate (M13) contribute strongly to the understanding of cross-national variation in female voting behavior. Finally, when comparing the two comprehensive models (M9 and M14) a Likelihood ratio test shows that the model including cultural indicators has a higher explanatory power. It reduces the variance to 5.7 percent.
Conclusion and Discussion
This article explored the impact of individual and, in particular, countrylevel factors on the cross-national variation in gender voting behavior in order to update previous findings and enrich them with a contextual (macro) perspective.
Our results reveal that the integration of contextual information is important not only for the understanding of differences in voting behavior between men and women, but also across countries. The descriptive results for 2008 indicate that, in comparison with previous studies for the 1990s and the 2000s, the modern gender voting gap can nowadays be confirmed for most of the twenty-five examined countries. It is clearly exhibited even in countries like Italy, Spain, Luxembourg, and Finland which resisted the modern gender voting gap in the last decades. At least for the three former countries, this supports Inglehart's and Norris' developmental theory that the impact of secularization and other modernization processes will foster the development of a modern electoral gender gap. However, the late occurrence of a modern gender gap in Finland, which was among the first countries allowing women to vote and which has a long tradition of gender equality, remains a puzzle. A further study is needed to clarify the influence of the Finnish political party system and the structure of political cleavages on women's left/right voting in the past and present.
With respect to former communist countries, our descriptive findings point toward the persistence of women's right-wing preferences. This result casts doubt upon the developmental theory. Two possible explanations can be given for this result; either this indicates that the adoption of a democratic culture, in combination with a cultural value change, created a specific challenge for women requiring more than 20 years of post-communism until a modern gender voting gap appeared. Alternatively, it might also be argued that left parties in post-communist countries behave differently than those in traditional democracies, rendering them less attractive for female voters. However, as the focus of this article was more on the explanation of cross-national differences, these possible explanations would need a much more detailed micro-level analysis for a selected group of countries. In addition, our study shows a reemergence of the traditional gender gap and women's conservatism in Ireland. The reason for this turn is not obvious. Either a religious and/or cultural backlash seems to have taken place during the last decade, which might be related to the still predominant role of Catholicism in Irish society. This, in turn, could be related to more conservative attitudes towards gender equality. Alternatively, women's political preferences may have changed for other reasons, like the economic crisis. Also in this case, an in-depth study would be required to gain a better understanding of the underlying reasons. Finally, this study has also shown that there are differences in the size of the modern gender gap in voting. It is biggest in the Nordic countries (but also Switzerland and Cyprus) which confirms previous findings that these countries display a significant advance in female left voting since the 1990s (Giger 2009; Inglehart and Norris 2000) .
Regarding the empirical analyses and the question in how far particularly contextual factors account for the observed cross-national differences in female voting behavior, two dimensions have been distinguished in the present analysis: the socio-structural and the cultural-attitudinal dimension. For each of them, a group of indicators has been tested. With regard to socio-structural factors, the findings support our expectation that, in countries where women take an active part in the labor market (either full-or part-time), they are also more likely to support leftist parties. The cross-level effect for female unemployment, however, indicates that as soon as women experience labor market inequalities (i.e., an above-average female unemployment rate), women's left-wing preferences become reduced. This could indicate that women might rather rely on rightist parties to improve the economic situation. This effect should, however, be treated with caution as it becomes insignificant when the average female unemployment rate of the years 2003 -2008 is taken into account. This could also point toward an exceptional period effect 10 and would require a more thorough analysis.
Besides the contribution of socio-structural factors to the understanding of cross-national differences in female voting behavior, we emphasized that a country's cultural-attitudinal context should be considered as well. In this context in particular, a country's gender empowerment, as well as the dominance of Catholicism are both important. Our finding that a high level of women's empowerment strengthens their support for left parties partly confirms Inglehart's and Norris' developmental theory. 11 In contrast, the religious climate and, in particular, the dominance of Catholicism within a country has the opposite effect. The more predominant Catholicism is in a culture, the more women tend to support right-wing parties. Overall, our analyses underline the necessity that both the socio-structural and the cultural-attitudinal macro dimension of a country have to be considered when seeking to explain cross-national differences in women's voting behavior.
Finally, certain limitations of the current analysis must be mentioned. One point of critique might concern the measurement of the dependent variable. As the present analysis is based on survey data on intended voting behavior, we are aware that it does not observe actual voting behavior. This may lead to an overreporting of the willingness to go to the elections based on the prominent citizenship norm of taking part in elections. As we have not examined the voting behavior itself, but rather the party preferences, we expect nonetheless that a potential bias would equally impact left and right party preferences and, therefore, should not cause any serious methodological problems. In addition, we are aware that cross-sectional data provide limited insight into causal relationships (Winship and Morgan 1999) .
12 This would require longitudinal data, allowing the study of the influence of changes in the context on voting behavior and cross-national gender differences. Future research on this topic could therefore explore, for instance, gender-specific preferences in general (examining political topics and party features appreciated by women). Country-specific case studies of significant electoral gender gaps could, moreover, contribute to the identification of further political and social context factors for explaining the differences at the individual level.
Despite these limitations, the present study contributes to the understanding of the factors associated with gender differences in left/right voting in the European context. It extends previous research by using a more recent and broader dataset. Furthermore, it demonstrates that the socio-structural and cultural-attitudinal climate of a country is significantly associated with different male and female voting preferences.
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1. While Inglehart's and Norris' (2000) study is based on the World Value Survey, Giger (2009) Erickson and O'Neill 2002) .
4. The categories of variable v264 consist of all political parties included in the field questionnaires. Variable v264_LR is based on the positioning of political parties on a left/right scale given in the methodological reports (see EVS 2008-Variable Report) . This expert judgment correlates with the categorization of the parties given by the Comparative Manifestos Dataset ("rile"-measure: left/right The Gender Gap in Voting Revisited ideological index which ranges between 2 64.7 (left) and 57.3 (right) (Pearson's r ¼ 0.5) and which represents a combined (additive) measurement indicating the left/right position of a party (see Laver and Budge 1992) . We decided to use the EVS measurement rather than the Manifesto Data for several reasons: First, it provides comparable scales for the countries. Second, data collection took place simultaneously with the collection of the individual data of the EVS. Third, this also means that the parties can be unambiguously assigned a value (which is not always the case with the Manifesto Data).
5. Income is not used, as the EVS only provides information on the household income which is less precise.
6. The correlation between the post-materialistic climate country index and the Gender Empowerment Measure is r ¼ 0.66. This however caused no problem in the analysis as the indicators were included separately.
7. Nevertheless, we think that it is justified to apply concepts of voting behavior developed for the analysis of Western European countries to the "new" democracies in East Central Europe. For instance, van der Brug et al. concluded in their comparative study on vote choices in West and East Central Europe that the "determinants of party support are strikingly similar" (2008, 598) . Rudi (2010) points out that voters in Central Eastern European countries relate nearly the same political content with the concepts of left and right as their Western European counterparts and concludes that electoral research can compare the concepts.
8. The total variance is composed of the variance between individuals' s2 and the variance between countries s 00. 9. A possible reason for the insignificant coefficients might be related to the small number of units at the country level.
10. In addition, to test the robustness of our effects, we also calculated models including the averages over the period 2003 -2008 for all the other socio-structural variables in our analysis. However, all effects remained the same.
11. Since a higher postmaterialistic climate correlated with a higher GEM and vice versa, we could conclude that it might work as a more precise measure of a countries more progressive and modern "cultural gender climate".
12. In order to test the robustness of our results and to address the causality problem, we modeled the socio-structural macro-level effects (M3 -M8) also as averages over a period of five years. The effects and their significance remain the same. However, the use of longitudinal data would allow for a more appropriate dealing with the causality problem.
